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fix(deps): update dependency astro to v4.16.18 [security] #146

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@svc-secops svc-secops commented Oct 15, 2024

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
astro (source) 4.15.9 -> 4.16.18 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-47885

Summary

A DOM Clobbering gadget has been discoverd in Astro's client-side router. It can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in websites enables Astro's client-side routing and has stored attacker-controlled scriptless HTML elements (i.e., iframe tags with unsanitized name attributes) on the destination pages.

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Astro

We identified a DOM Clobbering gadget in Astro's client-side routing module, specifically in the <ViewTransitions /> component. When integrated, this component introduces the following vulnerable code, which is executed during page transitions (e.g., clicking an <a> link):

https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/7814a6cad15f06931f963580176d9b38aa7819f2/packages/astro/src/transitions/router.ts#L135-L156

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.scripts lookup can be shadowed by an attacker injected non-script HTML elements (e.g., <img name="scripts"><img name="scripts">) via the browser's named DOM access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script elements with an array of attacker-controlled scriptless HTML elements.

The condition script.dataset.astroExec === '' on line 138 can be bypassed because the attacker-controlled element does not have a data-astroExec attribute. Similarly, the check on line 134 can be bypassed as the element does not require a type attribute.

Finally, the innerHTML of an attacker-injected non-script HTML elements, which is plain text content before, will be set to the .innerHTML of an script element that leads to XSS.

PoC

Consider a web application using Astro as the framework with client-side routing enabled and allowing users to embed certain scriptless HTML elements (e.g., form or iframe). This can be done through a bunch of website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

For PoC website, please refer to: https://stackblitz.com/edit/github-4xgj2d. Clicking the "about" button in the menu will trigger an alert(1) from an attacker-injected form element.

---
import Header from "../components/Header.astro";
import Footer from "../components/Footer.astro";
import { ViewTransitions } from "astro:transitions";
import "../styles/global.css";
const { pageTitle } = Astro.props;
---
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/favicon.svg" />
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width" />
    <meta name="generator" content={Astro.generator} />
    <title>{pageTitle}</title>
    <ViewTransitions />
  </head>
  <body>
    <!--USER INPUT-->
    <iframe name="scripts">alert(1)</iframe>
    <iframe name="scripts">alert(1)</iframe>
    <!--USER INPUT-->
    
    <Header />
    <h1>{pageTitle}</h1>
    <slot />
    <Footer />
    <script>
      import "../scripts/menu.js";
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that built with Astro that enable the client-side routing with ViewTransitions and store the user-inserted scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name attributes on the page.

Patch

We recommend replacing document.scripts with document.getElementsByTagName('script') for referring to script elements. This will mitigate the possibility of DOM Clobbering attacks leveraging the name attribute.

Reference

Similar issues for reference:

CVE-2024-56140

Summary

A bug in Astro’s CSRF-protection middleware allows requests to bypass CSRF checks.

Details

When the security.checkOrigin configuration option is set to true, Astro middleware will perform a CSRF check. (Source code: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/6031962ab5f56457de986eb82bd24807e926ba1b/packages/astro/src/core/app/middlewares.ts)

For example, with the following Astro configuration:

// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@&#8203;astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
	output: 'server',
	security: { checkOrigin: true },
	adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});

A request like the following would be blocked if made from a different origin:

// fetch API or <form action="https://test.example.com/" method="POST">
fetch('https://test.example.com/', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: 'a=b',
	headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
});
// => Cross-site POST form submissions are forbidden

However, a vulnerability exists that can bypass this security.

Pattern 1: Requests with a semicolon after the Content-Type

A semicolon-delimited parameter is allowed after the type in Content-Type.

Web browsers will treat a Content-Type such as application/x-www-form-urlencoded; abc as a simple request and will not perform preflight validation. In this case, CSRF is not blocked as expected.

fetch('https://test.example.com', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: 'test',
	headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded; abc' },
});
// => Server-side functions are executed (Response Code 200).

Pattern 2: Request without Content-Type header

The Content-Type header is not required for a request. The following examples are sent without a Content-Type header, resulting in CSRF.

// Pattern 2.1 Request without body
fetch('http://test.example.com', { method: 'POST', credentials: 'include' });

// Pattern 2.2 Blob object without type
fetch('https://test.example.com', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: new Blob(['a=b'], {}),
});

Impact

Bypass CSRF protection implemented with CSRF middleware.

Note

Even with credentials: 'include', browsers may not send cookies due to third-party cookie blocking. This feature depends on the browser version and settings, and is for privacy protection, not as a CSRF measure.

CVE-2024-56159

Summary

A bug in the build process allows any unauthenticated user to read parts of the server source code.

Details

During build, along with client assets such as css and font files, the sourcemap files for the server code are moved to a publicly-accessible folder.
https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/176fe9f113fd912f9b61e848b00bbcfecd6d5c2c/packages/astro/src/core/build/static-build.ts#L139

Any outside party can read them with an unauthorized HTTP GET request to the same server hosting the rest of the website.

While some server files are hashed, making their access obscure, the files corresponding to the file system router (those in src/pages) are predictably named. For example. the sourcemap file for src/pages/index.astro gets named dist/client/pages/index.astro.mjs.map.

PoC

Here is one example of an affected open-source website:
https://creatorsgarten.org/pages/index.astro.mjs.map

The file can be saved and opened using https://evanw.github.io/source-map-visualization/ to reconstruct the source code.

The above accurately mirrors the source code as seen in the repository: https://github.com/creatorsgarten/creatorsgarten.org/blob/main/src/pages/index.astro

The above was found as the 4th result (and the first one on Astro 5.0+) when making the following search query on GitHub.com (search results link):

path:astro.config.mjs @&#8203;sentry/astro

This vulnerability is the root cause of https://github.com/withastro/astro/issues/12703, which links to a simple stackblitz project demonstrating the vulnerability. Upon build, notice the contents of the dist/client (referred to as config.build.client in astro code) folder. All astro servers make the folder in question accessible to the public internet without any authentication. It contains .map files corresponding to the code that runs on the server.

Impact

All server-output (SSR) projects on Astro 5 versions v5.0.3 through v5.0.6 (inclusive), that have sourcemaps enabled, either directly or through an add-on such as sentry, are affected. The fix for server-output projects was released in [email protected].

Additionally, all static-output (SSG) projects built using Astro 4 versions 4.16.17 or older, or Astro 5 versions 5.0.7 or older, that have sourcemaps enabled are also affected. The fix for static-output projects was released in [email protected], and backported to Astro v4 in [email protected].

The immediate impact is limited to source code. Any secrets or environment variables are not exposed unless they are present verbatim in the source code.

There is no immediate loss of integrity within the the vulnerable server. However, it is possible to subsequently discover another vulnerability via the revealed source code .

There is no immediate impact to availability of the vulnerable server. However, the presence of an unsafe regular expression, for example, can quickly be exploited to subsequently compromise the availability.

  • Network attack vector.
  • Low attack complexity.
  • No privileges required.
  • No interaction required from an authorized user.
  • Scope is limited to first party. Although the source code of closed-source third-party software may also be exposed.

Remediation

The fix for server-output projects was released in [email protected], and the fix for static-output projects was released in [email protected] and backported to Astro v4 in [email protected]. Users are advised to update immediately if they are using sourcemaps or an integration that enables sourcemaps.


DOM Clobbering Gadget found in astro's client-side router that leads to XSS

CVE-2024-47885 / GHSA-m85w-3h95-hcf9

More information

Details

Summary

A DOM Clobbering gadget has been discoverd in Astro's client-side router. It can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in websites enables Astro's client-side routing and has stored attacker-controlled scriptless HTML elements (i.e., iframe tags with unsanitized name attributes) on the destination pages.

Details
Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Astro

We identified a DOM Clobbering gadget in Astro's client-side routing module, specifically in the <ViewTransitions /> component. When integrated, this component introduces the following vulnerable code, which is executed during page transitions (e.g., clicking an <a> link):

https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/7814a6cad15f06931f963580176d9b38aa7819f2/packages/astro/src/transitions/router.ts#L135-L156

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.scripts lookup can be shadowed by an attacker injected non-script HTML elements (e.g., <img name="scripts"><img name="scripts">) via the browser's named DOM access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script elements with an array of attacker-controlled scriptless HTML elements.

The condition script.dataset.astroExec === '' on line 138 can be bypassed because the attacker-controlled element does not have a data-astroExec attribute. Similarly, the check on line 134 can be bypassed as the element does not require a type attribute.

Finally, the innerHTML of an attacker-injected non-script HTML elements, which is plain text content before, will be set to the .innerHTML of an script element that leads to XSS.

PoC

Consider a web application using Astro as the framework with client-side routing enabled and allowing users to embed certain scriptless HTML elements (e.g., form or iframe). This can be done through a bunch of website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

For PoC website, please refer to: https://stackblitz.com/edit/github-4xgj2d. Clicking the "about" button in the menu will trigger an alert(1) from an attacker-injected form element.

---
import Header from "../components/Header.astro";
import Footer from "../components/Footer.astro";
import { ViewTransitions } from "astro:transitions";
import "../styles/global.css";
const { pageTitle } = Astro.props;
---
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/favicon.svg" />
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width" />
    <meta name="generator" content={Astro.generator} />
    <title>{pageTitle}</title>
    <ViewTransitions />
  </head>
  <body>
    <!--USER INPUT-->
    <iframe name="scripts">alert(1)</iframe>
    <iframe name="scripts">alert(1)</iframe>
    <!--USER INPUT-->
    
    <Header />
    <h1>{pageTitle}</h1>
    <slot />
    <Footer />
    <script>
      import "../scripts/menu.js";
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that built with Astro that enable the client-side routing with ViewTransitions and store the user-inserted scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name attributes on the page.

Patch

We recommend replacing document.scripts with document.getElementsByTagName('script') for referring to script elements. This will mitigate the possibility of DOM Clobbering attacks leveraging the name attribute.

Reference

Similar issues for reference:

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Atro CSRF Middleware Bypass (security.checkOrigin)

CVE-2024-56140 / GHSA-c4pw-33h3-35xw

More information

Details

Summary

A bug in Astro’s CSRF-protection middleware allows requests to bypass CSRF checks.

Details

When the security.checkOrigin configuration option is set to true, Astro middleware will perform a CSRF check. (Source code: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/6031962ab5f56457de986eb82bd24807e926ba1b/packages/astro/src/core/app/middlewares.ts)

For example, with the following Astro configuration:

// astro.config.mjs
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@&#8203;astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
	output: 'server',
	security: { checkOrigin: true },
	adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});

A request like the following would be blocked if made from a different origin:

// fetch API or <form action="https://test.example.com/" method="POST">
fetch('https://test.example.com/', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: 'a=b',
	headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
});
// => Cross-site POST form submissions are forbidden

However, a vulnerability exists that can bypass this security.

Pattern 1: Requests with a semicolon after the Content-Type

A semicolon-delimited parameter is allowed after the type in Content-Type.

Web browsers will treat a Content-Type such as application/x-www-form-urlencoded; abc as a simple request and will not perform preflight validation. In this case, CSRF is not blocked as expected.

fetch('https://test.example.com', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: 'test',
	headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded; abc' },
});
// => Server-side functions are executed (Response Code 200).
Pattern 2: Request without Content-Type header

The Content-Type header is not required for a request. The following examples are sent without a Content-Type header, resulting in CSRF.

// Pattern 2.1 Request without body
fetch('http://test.example.com', { method: 'POST', credentials: 'include' });

// Pattern 2.2 Blob object without type
fetch('https://test.example.com', {
	method: 'POST',
	credentials: 'include',
	body: new Blob(['a=b'], {}),
});
Impact

Bypass CSRF protection implemented with CSRF middleware.

[!Note]
Even with credentials: 'include', browsers may not send cookies due to third-party cookie blocking. This feature depends on the browser version and settings, and is for privacy protection, not as a CSRF measure.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Astro's server source code is exposed to the public if sourcemaps are enabled

CVE-2024-56159 / GHSA-49w6-73cw-chjr

More information

Details

Summary

A bug in the build process allows any unauthenticated user to read parts of the server source code.

Details

During build, along with client assets such as css and font files, the sourcemap files for the server code are moved to a publicly-accessible folder.
https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/176fe9f113fd912f9b61e848b00bbcfecd6d5c2c/packages/astro/src/core/build/static-build.ts#L139

Any outside party can read them with an unauthorized HTTP GET request to the same server hosting the rest of the website.

While some server files are hashed, making their access obscure, the files corresponding to the file system router (those in src/pages) are predictably named. For example. the sourcemap file for src/pages/index.astro gets named dist/client/pages/index.astro.mjs.map.

PoC

Here is one example of an affected open-source website:
https://creatorsgarten.org/pages/index.astro.mjs.map

The file can be saved and opened using https://evanw.github.io/source-map-visualization/ to reconstruct the source code.

The above accurately mirrors the source code as seen in the repository: https://github.com/creatorsgarten/creatorsgarten.org/blob/main/src/pages/index.astro

The above was found as the 4th result (and the first one on Astro 5.0+) when making the following search query on GitHub.com (search results link):

path:astro.config.mjs @&#8203;sentry/astro

This vulnerability is the root cause of https://github.com/withastro/astro/issues/12703, which links to a simple stackblitz project demonstrating the vulnerability. Upon build, notice the contents of the dist/client (referred to as config.build.client in astro code) folder. All astro servers make the folder in question accessible to the public internet without any authentication. It contains .map files corresponding to the code that runs on the server.

Impact

All server-output (SSR) projects on Astro 5 versions v5.0.3 through v5.0.6 (inclusive), that have sourcemaps enabled, either directly or through an add-on such as sentry, are affected. The fix for server-output projects was released in [email protected].

Additionally, all static-output (SSG) projects built using Astro 4 versions 4.16.17 or older, or Astro 5 versions 5.0.7 or older, that have sourcemaps enabled are also affected. The fix for static-output projects was released in [email protected], and backported to Astro v4 in [email protected].

The immediate impact is limited to source code. Any secrets or environment variables are not exposed unless they are present verbatim in the source code.

There is no immediate loss of integrity within the the vulnerable server. However, it is possible to subsequently discover another vulnerability via the revealed source code .

There is no immediate impact to availability of the vulnerable server. However, the presence of an unsafe regular expression, for example, can quickly be exploited to subsequently compromise the availability.

  • Network attack vector.
  • Low attack complexity.
  • No privileges required.
  • No interaction required from an authorized user.
  • Scope is limited to first party. Although the source code of closed-source third-party software may also be exposed.
Remediation

The fix for server-output projects was released in [email protected], and the fix for static-output projects was released in [email protected] and backported to Astro v4 in [email protected]. Users are advised to update immediately if they are using sourcemaps or an integration that enables sourcemaps.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: Unknown
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

withastro/astro (astro)

v4.16.18

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Patch Changes

v4.16.17

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Patch Changes

v4.16.16

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Patch Changes

v4.16.15

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Patch Changes

v4.16.14

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Patch Changes

v4.16.13

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Patch Changes
  • #​12436 453ec6b Thanks @​martrapp! - Fixes a potential null access in the clientside router

  • #​12392 0462219 Thanks @​apatel369! - Fixes an issue where scripts were not correctly injected during the build. The issue was triggered when there were injected routes with the same entrypoint and different pattern

v4.16.12

Compare Source

Patch Changes
  • #​12420 acac0af Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes an issue where the dev server returns a 404 status code when a user middleware returns a valid Response.

v4.16.11

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Patch Changes

v4.16.10

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Patch Changes

v4.16.9

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Patch Changes

v4.16.8

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Patch Changes

v4.16.7

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Patch Changes

v4.16.6

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Patch Changes
  • #​11823 a3d30a6 Thanks @​DerTimonius! - fix: improve error message when inferSize is used in local images with the Image component

  • #​12227 8b1a641 Thanks @​florian-lefebvre! - Fixes a case where environment variables would not be refreshed when using astro:env

  • #​12239 2b6daa5 Thanks @​ematipico! - BREAKING CHANGE to the experimental Container API only

    Changes the default page rendering behavior of Astro components in containers, and adds a new option partial: false to render full Astro pages as before.

    Previously, the Container API was rendering all Astro components as if they were full Astro pages containing <!DOCTYPE html> by default. This was not intended, and now by default, all components will render as page partials: only the contents of the components without a page shell.

    To render the component as a full-fledged Astro page, pass a new option called partial: false to renderToString() and renderToResponse():

    import { experimental_AstroContainer as AstroContainer } from 'astro/container';
    import Card from '../src/components/Card.astro';
    
    const container = AstroContainer.create();
    
    await container.renderToString(Card); // the string will not contain `<!DOCTYPE html>`
    await container.renderToString(Card, { partial: false }); // the string will contain `<!DOCTYPE html>`

v4.16.5

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Patch Changes

v4.16.4

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Patch Changes
  • #​12223 79ffa5d Thanks @​ArmandPhilippot! - Fixes a false positive reported by the dev toolbar Audit app where a label was considered missing when associated with a button

    The button element can be used with a label (e.g. to create a switch) and should not be reported as an accessibility issue when used as a child of a label.

  • #​12199 c351352 Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes a regression in the computation of Astro.currentLocale

  • #​12222 fb55695 Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes an issue where the edge middleware couldn't correctly compute the client IP address when calling ctx.clientAddress()

v4.16.3

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Patch Changes

v4.16.2

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Patch Changes

v4.16.1

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Patch Changes

v4.16.0

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Minor Changes
  • #​12039 710a1a1 Thanks @​ematipico! - Adds a markdown.shikiConfig.langAlias option that allows aliasing a non-supported code language to a known language. This is useful when the language of your code samples is not a built-in Shiki language, but you want your Markdown source to contain an accurate language while also displaying syntax highlighting.

    The following example configures Shiki to highlight cjs code blocks using the javascript syntax highlighter:

    import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
    
    export default defineConfig({
      markdown: {
        shikiConfig: {
          langAlias: {
            cjs: 'javascript',
          },
        },
      },
    });

    Then in your Markdown, you can use the alias as the language for a code block for syntax highlighting:

    ```cjs
    'use strict';
    
    function commonJs() {
      return 'I am a commonjs file';
    }
    ```
  • #​11984 3ac2263 Thanks @​chaegumi! - Adds a new build.concurreny configuration option to specify the number of pages to build in parallel

    In most cases, you should not change the default value of 1.

    Use this option only when other attempts to reduce the overall rendering time (e.g. batch or cache long running tasks like fetch calls or data access) are not possible or are insufficient.

    Use this option only if the refactors are not possible. If the number is set too high, the page rendering may slow down due to insufficient memory resources and because JS is single-threaded.

    [!WARNING]
    This feature is stable and is not considered experimental. However, this feature is only intended to address difficult performance issues, and breaking changes may occur in a minor release to keep this option as performant as possible.

    // astro.config.mjs
    import { defineConfig } from 'astro';
    
    export default defineConfig({
      build: {
        concurrency: 2,
      },
    });
Patch Changes
  • #​12160 c6fd1df Thanks @​louisescher! - Fixes a bug where astro.config.mts and astro.config.cts weren't reloading the dev server upon modifications.

  • #​12130 e96bcae Thanks @​thehansys! - Fixes a bug in the parsing of x-forwarded-\* Request headers, where multiple values assigned to those headers were not correctly parsed.

    Now, headers like x-forwarded-proto: https,http are correctly parsed.

  • #​12147 9db755a Thanks @​ascorbic! - Skips setting statusMessage header for HTTP/2 response

    HTTP/2 doesn't support status message, so setting this was logging a warning.

  • #​12151 bb6d37f Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes an issue where Astro.currentLocale wasn't incorrectly computed when the defaultLocale belonged to a custom locale path.

  • Updated dependencies [710a1a1]:

v4.15.12

Compare Source

Patch Changes

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone America/Los_Angeles, Automerge - "after 8am and before 4pm on tuesday" in timezone America/Los_Angeles.

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


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@svc-secops svc-secops force-pushed the renovate/npm-astro-vulnerability branch from 73f1742 to 62f7b79 Compare December 19, 2024 13:54
@svc-secops svc-secops changed the title fix(deps): update dependency astro to v4.16.1 [security] fix(deps): update dependency astro to v4.16.17 [security] Dec 19, 2024
@svc-secops svc-secops force-pushed the renovate/npm-astro-vulnerability branch from 62f7b79 to 3d7d4f4 Compare December 20, 2024 12:03
@svc-secops svc-secops changed the title fix(deps): update dependency astro to v4.16.17 [security] fix(deps): update dependency astro to v4.16.18 [security] Dec 20, 2024
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